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8 
Political Participation 
over the Life Cycle 
Elders tut-tutting about the younger generation and its lack of political en-
gagement is an old but recurrent theme: 
The more I am around this generation of college students, the more I 
am ... baffled ... because they are so much less radical and politically 
engaged than they need to be .... America needs a jolt of the idealism, 
activism and outrage .... That's what twentysomethings are for-to 
light a fire under the country. But they can't e-mail it in.1 
But then, again, the same was said about Gen X: 
How depressing. A generation ago, young people damored to reform 
government and end a war, taking to the streets to fight what they 
regarded as wrong-headed policies and demanding that the voting 
age be lowered to 18 so more of them could be enfranchised. Now, 
many simply tune out politics and tune in TV .... That's too bad for 
democracy.2 
Indeed, this tune was sung about what ultimately became known as the Great-
est Generation: 
Jennifer Erkulwater is coauthor of this chapter. 
1. Thomas L. Friedman, "Generation Q;' New York Times, October 10, 2007. 
2. "Apathy on the Upswing;' Hartford Courant, February 3, 1995, p. A14. 
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The depression generation has scarcely had a chance to be lost. ... It 
would be a magnificent thing if many could not only participate, but 
participate in a real cause rather than in a hollow one. 3 
These periodic lamentations asking, "Why can't they be like we were?:"-
with or without the follow-up, "perfect in every way"-alert us to another 
basis for inequality of political voice. Although we have paid attention to 
group differences in political activity on the basis of race or ethnicity, gender, 
and especially socio-economic status (SES), we have so far ignored such dis-
parities among age groups, disparities that will become especially important 
in Chapter 16 when we consider inequalities in Internet-based political partic-
ipation. The participatory deficit of citizens who have recently entered the 
electorate raises the same kinds of questions we have been bringing to in-
equalities of political voice on the basis of socio-economic status: How do we 
account for disparities in political activity on the basis of age? What are their 
implications for the representation of the opinions, concerns, and needs of all? 
Life-Cycle, Period, and Cohort Effects 
Answering these questions poses many methodological challenges. The most 
familiar is the difficulty of disentangling life-cycle, cohort, and period effects.4 
Life-cycle effects refer to the social, psychological, and physical changes that 
take place as individuals age. In any society, particular experiences tend to 
correspond to particular stages in the life cycle. For example, in America 
most people leave school during their late teens or early to midtwenties, and 
many people in their late forties or early fifties confront an empty nest for the 
first time. Researchers who study social domains as varied as criminal behav-
ior and market behavior sometimes differentiate among the lasting impact 
throughout adulthood of what happens in childhood and adolescence; the 
ongoing changes in income, education, residence, family status, and other 
events that occur over the life cycle; and the impacts of such experiences as 
having actually committed a crime, purchased a product, or-more germane 
to our concerns-participated in politics.5 
3. "Unfounded Generation; New Republic, July 11, 1934, p. 224. 
4. The classic exposition of this problem is in Matilda White Riley, "Aging and Cohort 
Succession: Interpretations and Misinterpretations," Public Opinion Quarterly 37 (1973): 35-49. 
5. A large literature distinguishes between the impact of"heterogeneity" and that of"state 
dependence" on behavior. Heterogeneity refers to those characteristics that persist over time 
Political Participation over the Life Cycle 201 
We should not exaggerate the extent to which age mates move in lockstep 
through common experiences. Members of a single cohort do not stay in 
step as they march, or saunter, toward developmental milestones,6 and many 
of the differences within cohorts reflect differences among politically rele-
vant groups rather than the idiosyncrasies of individual choice. For example, 
among low-skilled black men, high rates of imprisonment mean that in-
carceration has emerged as a stage in the life cycle, affecting family formation 
and employment patterns for decades afterward.' In addition, the patterns of 
delayed matriculation in college and the failure to graduate among those who 
enroll are more typical of men than of women, and especially of those from 
socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds.8 Among women, the ten-
dency to put off childbearing is much more typical of well-educated women 
than of their less well-educated sisters.9 
-either those that persist over a lifetime, such as the legacy of childhood (for example, 
heredity, parents' SES, childhood socialization, experience with student government and 
other activities during high school, and educational attainment) or those that persist over 
shorter but still significant periods of time, such as job status, educational attainment, mari-
tal status, or residency. State dependence focuses on "habituation" that occurs when the per-
formance of a behavior changes the likelihood that a person will perform it again in the 
future. Those who perform criminal acts, for example, may develop a taste for crime or may 
learn that they can get away with it. Life-cycle effects may be the result either of relatively 
short-term changes in a person's characteristics or of habituation. See, for example, James J. 
Heckman, "Heterogeneity and State Dependence," in Studies in Labor Markets, ed. Sherwin 
Rosen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 91-140; Cheng Hsiao, Analysis of 
Panel Data (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986}, chap. 4; Badi H. Bal-
tagi, Econometric Analysis of Panel Data (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1995), chap. 8; and 
Daniel Nagin and Raymond Paternoster, "Population Heterogeneity and State Dependence: 
State of the Evidence and Directions for Future Research," Journal of Quantitative Criminol-
ogy 16 (2000}: 117-144. 
6. See Glen Elder Jr., "Perspectives on the Life Course," in Glen Elder Jr., Life Course 
Dynamics: Trajectories and Transitions, 1968-1980 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985}, 
pp. 31-36, and Ronald R. Rindfuss, C. Gray Swicegood, and Rachel A. Rosenfeld, "Disorder 
in the Life Course: How Common and Does It Matter?" American Sociological Review 52 
(1987): 785-801. 
7. Becky Pettit and Bruce Western, "Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and 
Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration; American Sociological Review 69 (2004): 151-169. 
8. See, for example, Robert Bozick and Stefanie DeLuca, "Better Late than Never? Delayed 
Enrollment in the High School to College Transition," Social Forces 84 (2005): 531-554, and 
John Bound, Michael F. Lovenheim, and Sarah Turner, "Why Have College Completion 
Rates Declined? An Analysis of Changing Student Preparation and Collegiate Resources; 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2 (2010): 129-157. 
9. Ronald R. Rindfuss, S. Philip Morgan, and Kate Offutt, "Education and the Changing 
Age Pattern of American Fertility: 1963-1989," Demography 33 (1996}: 277-290. 
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We must also understand that the participatory consequences of life-cycle 
events are not necessarily uniform across age mates. For example, the usual 
assumption is that marriage and family deepen one's commitment to the 
community and thus enhance political activity. However, among those under 
age thirty, marriage and children are associated with lower rates of participa-
tion, presumably as the result of selection processes such that many who 
delay these milestones of adulthood have other characteristics, in particular 
educational attainment, that are germane to participation.10 Furthermore, mar-
riage and especially having small children at home are associated with greater 
workforce commitment for men and the opposite for women, with, in turn, 
implications for the accumulation of such work-based participatory factors 
as the development of civic skills and exposure to requests for political 
activity. 11 Thus two of the most significant milestones in emerging adulthood 
work, on average, in opposite ways for women and men. Such considerations 
make clear that untangling the relationship between age and political partici-
pation is likely to be extremely difficult. Still, the advantage that accrues to 
the middle aged in terms of their stockpile of participatory factors suggests 
that they will be more active in politics. 
In Chapter 6 we investigated another process that would create disparities 
among age groups, habituation. There we considered whether engaging in 
political activity is itself a participatory factor that boosts future political 
participation-over and above the attributes that predispose some people to 
take part in the first place. We found that while going to the polls is habit-
forming, increasing the probability of turning out in the future, other forms 
of political activity are not. 
Period effects are those occasional shocks that boost or depress political 
activity more or less across the board. Watergate is sometimes thought to 
have had a period effect, raising levels of public cynicism among American 
adults regardless of age. Genuine period effects are probably quite rare. Because 
they have an impact on everyone-irrespective of age, social class, gender, 
and so on-at a particular moment, they raise an issue to which we refer fre-
10. Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone note that turnout is higher among young 
people who are in college than among cohorts who supposedly take on adult roles by work-
ing full time or getting married in Who Votes? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), 
pp. 55-58. 
11. See Nancy Burns, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba, The Private Roots of 
Public Action: Gender, Inequality and Political Participation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2001), chaps. 8 and 12. 
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quently throughout this inquiry: that changing the level of political activity 
does not necessarily alter its distribution. Therefore, as important as period 
effects can be for the political mobilization of citizens, our concern with 
inequalities of political voice implies that we should put them aside in our 
discussion. 
As students of socialization make clear, we are especially permeable to the 
effects of early experiences. The kinds of historical events that leave social 
change in their wake tend to have an especially profound and lasting impact 
on the young.U Thus, generational or cohort effects, which arise from the shared 
social and historical experiences of those who were born during the same 
era, can be understood as a combination of life-cycle effects and period 
effects}3 Although we often discuss generational effects in terms of the endur-
ing impact of major historical events-for example, the Depression of the 
1930s, World War II, and 9/11-on those who experience them as they come 
of age, the social forces that create generational effects need not be confined 
to great historical events. The emergence of Face book and other social media 
is a contemporary example of a social development with disproportionate 
consequences for those who were born in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Some of these generational differences involve differences among cohorts 
in the timing and sequencing of life-cycle events. Those who came of age 
during the 1950s were known to marry early and have children, lots of them, 
at a young age. In contrast, reflecting changing economic constraints, young 
people today are taking longer than their predecessors to achieve the tradi-
tional markers of adulthood: spending more time on their education; delay-
12. Period effects can also have a disproportionate effect on groups in society defined by 
attributes other than their age. For example, the experience of living through the civil rights 
era of the 1960s might have had a different and more pronounced effect on blacks than on 
whites. In addition, period effects become generational effects as older people who have 
been exposed to whatever is producing the period effect die off and are replaced by younger 
people who have not experienced the source of the period effect. 
13. Generational theory was most succinctly put forth in the late 1920s by Karl Mannheim 
in his essay "The Problem of Generations;' in Karl Mannheim', Essays on the Sociology of 
Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952). According to Mannheim, a genera-
tional unit is not merely a chronological age unit but a social unit, much like a class. It is 
formed by an age group, similarly situated in the social and historical processes, whose shared 
experiences form a common outlook and a sense of solidarity among its members. Mann-
heim saw the young as particularly impressionable to social, economic, and political change 
but believed that in order for such change to produce a generational difference, the events 
must have either a disproportionate impact on the young compared to other segments of the 
population or must affect the young in ways different from other age groups. 
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ing marriage, often in favor of cohabitation; and waiting longer before starting 
a family. They are also more likely to have high levels of debt and to rely on 
their parents longer for financial support. Compared to earlier cohorts, they 
are, as we saw in Chapter 3, also seeing their incomes rise less steeply as they 
age.14 This generational distinctiveness in what is sometimes called "the chang-
ing timetable of adulthood;' holds potential long-term consequences for dis-
parities in political participation. 
Life-Cycle and Generational Effects: 
Additional Considerations 
As the discussion so far should already have made clear, it is extremely diffi-
cult to disentangle life-cycle from generational effects. Using the kind of 
cross-sectional evidence on which we often rely, it is impossible to do so. The 
perfect data set for sorting out these matters-a panel, conducted over a long 
period, that contains a rich array of measures of political participation and 
the multiple factors that facilitate it-does not exist. Therefore, in this chap-
ter we do the best we can by using several kinds of data: panel data from the 
American National Election Studies (ANES); the rolling cross-section from 
the 1952-2008 ANES; cross-sectional data from the U.S. Census; the 1990 
Citizen Participation Study; the 2004 Public Agendas and Citizen Engage-
ment Survey (PACES); and the August 2008 election survey of the Pew Inter-
net and American Life Project. 
Rendering the task even more complicated for our concern with equality 
of political voice is that the distinction between life-cycle and cohort effects 
is germane not only for political activity but also for the factors that foster it 
and for political preferences and interests. For example, education attain-
ment has both a life-cycle and a generational component. Because many 
people in their late teens and early twenties are still in school, they are not 
especially well educated. Although some people do return to school later on, 
most people today complete their educations by their mid- to late twenties, 
after which educational attainment is, by and large, stable. The cohort com-
ponent arises from the extent to which levels of educational attainment have 
14. On these themes, see the essays in Richard A. Settersten, Frank F. Furstenbe~g Jr., and 
Ruben G. Rumbaut, eds., On the Frontier of Adulthood: Theory, Research, and Public Policy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), and Sheldon Danziger and Ceclia Elena Rouse, 
eds., The Price of Independence: The Economics of Early Adulthood (New York: Russell Sage, 
2007), as well as Frank F. Furstenberg Jr., "On a New Schedule: Transitions to Adulthood and 
Family Change," The Future of Children 20 (2010): 67-87. 
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risen with successive generations, a pattern that may, for the first time, no 
longer obtain for the current generation. 
Compounding these complexities is the fact that the distinction between 
life-cycle and cohort effects also pertains to age-group differences in political 
attitudes, needs, and preferences. In the next section we distinguish differ-
ences of opinion among age groups on such matters as, on one hand, funding 
for education and Social Security, which have roots in the life cycle, and, on 
the other, sex on television or gay rights, which are characterized by cohort 
differences. 
Do We Really Need to Be Concerned about 
Age-Group Disparities in Political Voice? 
Parents and teachers often reprove younger children, arguing that they need 
only be patient, and one day the freedoms and privileges exercised by older 
siblings and schoolmates will be theirs to enjoy. The your-turn-will-come 
logic underlying this admonition makes clear an important characteristic of 
disparities in political voice among age groups and suggests that, from the 
perspective of political voice, perhaps they are not really cause for concern. 
As the young settle down, finish school, find careers, get married, and acquire 
children and mortgages, they will pass out of their low-activity phase and 
catch up to their elders in participation. Thus, for those who live a normal life 
span, political voice on the basis of age is equalized across the life cycle-in 
contrast to participatory deficits based on such ordinarily unchanging char-
acteristics as race or ethnicity, gender, and, to a lesser extent, social class. 
When considered over a lifetime, the participatory playing field of the age-
group game appears fair. 
But what if age is itself a politically relevant category and there are system-
atic differences among age groups in their political attitudes and concerns or 
in their stake in particular public policies? There is evidence for age-related 
differences that represent a generational phenomenoQ..15 Figure 8.1 plots data 
from the 2004 PACES about whether respondents deem "sex on television" 
or "being gay" to be problems for society. The data show an age gradient for 
both, with young people significantly less likely than their elders to consider 
15. On the way that "young people have distinct interests," see Peter Levine, 7he Future of 
Democracy: Developing the Next Generation of American Citizens (Medford, MA: Tufts Uni-
versity Press, 2007), pp. 60-61. 
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Figure 8.1 Perception of Social Problems by Age: Percentage Who Consider 
"Sex on Television'' or "Being Gay" a Problem for Society 
Source: Political Agendas and Citizen Engagement Survey (2004). 
either homosexuality or sexual content on television to be a problem. While 
it is possible that these differences between age groups reflect changes in atti-
tudes over the life cycle, research shows that opinions regarding sexuality 
change from cohort to cohort over time.16 Consequently, if younger people are 
less politically active, political voice will disproportionately reflect the atti-
tudes of older people, creating a "cultural lag" in the political system with 
16. On opinion with respect to homosexuality and gay rights, see Jeni Loftus, "America's 
Liberalization in Attitudes toward Homosexuality, 1973 to 1998;' American Sociological 
Review 66 (2001): 762-782; Alison G. Keleher and Eric R. A. N. Smith, "Explaining the Grow-
ing Support for Gay and Lesbian Equality since 1990," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 2008; Robert Andersen and 
Tina Fetner, "Cohort Differences in Tolerance of Homosexuality: Attitudinal Change in Can-
ada and the United States, 1981-2000;' Public Opinion Quarterly 72 (2008): 311-330; and 
Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips, "Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy 
Responsiveness," American Political Science Review 103 (2009): 367-386. On attitudes toward 
sexual issues, see Judith Treas, "How Cohorts, Education, and Ideology Shaped a New Sexual 
Revolution on American Attitudes toward Nonmarital Sex, 1972-1998;' Sociological Perspec-
tives 45 (2002): 267-283, and David J. Harding and Christopher Jencks, "Changing Attitudes 
toward Premarital Sex: Cohort, Period, and Aging Effects;' Public Opinion Quarterly 67 
(2003): 211-226. 
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respect to views on homosexuality and sexual freedom. Such a cohort effect 
would lead-to a transitory disparity between public attitudes and political 
voice. Over time, however, public opinion and political voice would come to 
be in sync. 
When coupled with inequalities in political activity, differences of opin-
ion among age groups anchored in life-cycle effects pose a greater challenge 
to equality of political voice. Many government programs-of which Social 
Security and public education are obvious examples-target benefits on the 
basis of age. Figure 8.2 presents PACES data that show age structuring with 
respect to both opposition to any change in Social Security in the face of 
President George W. Bush's call for privatization and support for increased 
funding for K-12 education. Unlike younger people, the elderly-who had 
lived through the Depression of the 1930s, who would not be able to benefit 
from decades of appreciation of equity investments for retirement income, 
and who would be spared the brunt of any long-run insolvency in Social 
Security-would have reason to support maintaining the defined benefits 
feature of Social Security. 17 In light of such considerations, it is not surpris-
ing that the elderly were most likely to favor retaining a traditional approach 
to Social Security and younger age groups were more congenial to privatiz-
ing Social Security. In contrast, consistent with what we might expect, when 
it comes to educational funding, support for increases in spending on pre-
collegiate education was highest among those who were under age twenty-
five and eroded steadily across age groups. Similarly, in Figure 8.3-which 
repeats the data about support for increases in spending on precollegiate edu-
cation and adds data about support for aid for students in higher education-
the youngest group was the most likely, and the oldest group the least likely, 
to express support for such aid. 
That these age differences in support for education versus Social Security-
which make a great deal of prima facie sense-have persisted over time sug-
gests that we are seeing attitudinal differences with life-cycle, rather than 
generational, roots.18 The consequence of such continui_ng age-structured atti-
tudinal differences is that, at least when it comes to political voice through 
individual activity, such youth-related matters as grants and loans for higher 
17. Similarly, an item in the 2008 ANES about allowing people to invest their Social Secu-
rity payroll taxes in stocks and bonds shows a sharp trajectory of increasing rejection among 
those over forty. 
18. Although there is some disagreement, many studies demonstrate that senior citizens 
support policies beneficial to their self-interest. See, for example, William Mayer, The Changing 
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Figure 8.2 Support for Government Spending by Age: Percentage Who 
Support Increased K-12 Spending or Oppose Social Security Privatization 
Source: Political Agendas and Citizen Engagement Survey (2004). 
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Figure 8.3 Support for Education Spending by Age: Percentage Who 
Support K-12 and Higher Education Spending 
Source: Political Agendas and Citizen Engagement Survey (2004). 
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education will not achieve their proportionate share of advocacy. In fact, 
concerns about the continuing failure of the elderly to support education 
impelled Paul E. Peterson to propose, presumably in jest, that children-who 
are dependent for political voice and so much else on the kindness of their 
elders-should be allowed to vote so that they could protect their interests in 
government programs on their behalf in a manner parallel to the way that 
seniors have protected Social Security and Medicare.19 Thus, if political pref-
erences and interests change over the life cycle, enduring participatory dif-
ferences among age groups would be of concern from the perspective of 
equality of political voice. Although each cohort would average out any age-
related participatory differences over the life cycle, the distinctive concerns 
and needs of age groups with ongoing deficits in political activity would be 
underrepresented on a continuing basis-an obvious compromise of equality 
of political voice.20 
American Mind: How and Why American Public Opinion Changed between 1960 and 1988 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); Susan A. MacManus, Young versus Old: 
Generational Combat in the 21st Century (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Andrea Lou-
ise Campbell, How Politics Makes Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare 
State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); and James H. Schulz and Robert H. 
Binstock, Aging Nation: The Economics and Politics of Growing Older in America (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2006). 
A great deal of other research suggests that the elderly are less supportive ofK-12 educa-
tion. Cynthia Miller, in "Demographics and Spending for Public Education: A Test oflnterest 
Group Influence," Economics of Education Review IS (1996): 175-185, finds that spending on 
education increases with the percentage of parents in the state or county. James M. Poterba, 
in "Demographic Structure and the Political Economy of Public Education," NBER Working 
Paper W5677, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, July 1996, and Amy 
Rehder Harris, William N. Evans, and Robert M. Schwab, in "Education Spending in an 
Aging America," journal of Public Economics 81 (2001): 449-472, find that it decreases with 
the fraction of elderly residents in a jurisdiction. For a partly dissenting opinion, see Helen F. 
Ladd and Sheila E. Murray, "Intergenerational Conflict Reconsidered: County Demographic 
Structures and the Demand for Public Education," Economics of Education Review 20 (2001): 
343-357. In "The Guns of Autumn? Age Differences in Support for Income Transfers to the 
Young and Old," Public Opinion Quarterly 52 (1988): 441-466, Michael Ponza, Greg J. Dun-
can, Mary Corcoran, and Fred Groskind find senior citizens to be less supportive of spending 
for education and welfare but show complex results for Social Security. Eric Plutzer and 
Michael Berkman, in "The Graying of America and Support for Funding the Nation's Schools;' 
Public Opinion Quarterly 69 (2005): 66-86, agree that surveys have long showed older Amer-
icans to be less likely than younger citizens to endorse increased spending on public schools 
but argue that a cohort effect is in part responsible. 
19. Paul E. Peterson, "An Immodest Proposal," Daedalus 121 (1992): 151-174. 
20. For a philosophical discussion of the issue of how to reconcile the younger self with 
the older self, see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, England: Clarendon, 1984). 
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Why Would Age Groups Differ in Their Participation? 
If shared generational experiences result in the widespread mobilization or 
deactivation of a group of young citizens on a long-term basis, that cohort 
will be advantaged, or disadvantaged, with respect to political voice in com-
parison to the generations that precede or succeed it.21 When the gray of head 
rue the political apathy of the young, they make an implicit assumption that 
such generational processes are at work. 
Still, there are reasons to expect variations in political participation over 
the life cycle. It is often argued that the young are less active in politics because 
they are unsettled and preoccupied with the enterprise of becoming adults. 
As a study of political participation conducted several decades ago put it: "In 
the early years one has the problem of 'start-up: Individuals are still un-
settled; they are likely to be residentially and occupationally mobile. They 
have yet to develop the stake in the politics of a particular locality that comes 
with extended residence, with home ownership, with children in school, and 
the like:•n Some analysts who focus on the participatory consequences of the 
start-up phase focus on the impact of particular life events-for example, 
finding a job, getting married, buying a house, and having children. s"eyond 
the ways that such life-cycle milestones function to anchor the unsettled into 
adulthood, owning a home and having children in school are presumed to 
give citizens a stake in public outcomes. 
Focusing exclusively on life events may distract from the extent to which 
an array of changes over the lif~ cycle will have repercussions for the accu-
mulation of a variety of factors that foster participation.23 Table 8.1 shows the 
differences among age groups with respect to a variety of such factors and 
gives evidence of both life-cycle and generational phenomena.24 Because it is 
so rich in measures of a variety of participatory factors, we use the 1990 Citi-
zen Participation Study. These data, which provide a cross-sectional snap-
shot, cannot be used to distinguish cohort and life-cycle effects. In fact, the 
21. For a discussion of generational and period changes in participation, see Paul Allen 
Beck and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Periods and Political Participation;' American Political 
Science Review 73 {1979): 737-750. 
22. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1972), p. 139. 
23. See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the way that capacity, motivation, and location in 
social networks operate to foster political participation. 
24. Question wording for the items summarized in Table 8.1 can be found in Sidney 
Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism 
in American Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), Appendix B. 
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curvilinear patterns in the table could be due to the combined impact of age, 
period, or cohort effects.25 Whenever possible, we use the 1952 to 2008 ANES 
to sort out cohort and life-cycle effects and report these results in footnotes.26 
Although the magnitude of effects may vary over time, we are confident that 
the pattern shown in Table 8.1 is correct. 
Many of these participatory factors show a curvilinear pattern with the 
young, especially those under twenty-five, and the elderly commanding a 
much smaller stockpile of participatory factors than those in their forties and 
fifties. For example, those in their late teens or early twenties are neither 
especially well educated nor affiuent. 27 Many of those who eventually achieve 
college, and especially post-graduate degrees, have not completed their edu-
cation at this point. Although increasing numbers of nontraditional students 
return to college classrooms later on, most people complete their education 
by their mid-twenties.28 When it comes to income, the twentysomethings are 
just beginning to establish their careers and are decades away from their 
peak earning power.29 At the other end of the life cycle, the relatively low 
levels of educational attainment among those who are over age sixty probably 
represent a generational phenomenon-the fact that, at least until recently, 
successive cohorts have enjoyed widening educational opportunities-while 
low levels of family income reflect the life-cycle phenomenon of retirement.30 
25. See Matilda White Riley, "Aging and Cohort Succession:' For several reasons-ranging 
from necessity to the fact that, in any cross-section, period effects may have consequences for 
the level of participation without having an impact on its distribution-we neglect period 
effects in our analysis. 
26. We use age and cohort dummy variables in repeated cross-sections to show that there 
is strong evidence of life-cycle effects even after controlling for cohorts. 
27. An age and cohort regression using the ANES data confirms these results and demon-
strates that, as discussed earlier, there is both a life-cycle and a cohort effect when it comes to 
education. 
28. Muriel Egerton and Gareth Parry, "Lifelong Debt: Rates of Return to Mature Study;' 
Higher Education Quarterly 55 (2001): 4-27; Jerry A. Jacobs and Rosalind Berkowitz King, 
"Age and College Completion: A Life-History Analysis of Women Aged 15-44:' Sociology of 
Education 75 (2002): 211-230. 
29. Economists estimate that about 30 percent of income inequality is due to life-cycle 
effects. See Alan Blinder, Toward an Economic Theory of Income Distribution (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1974). Note that the youngest respondents, those under age twenty-five, reported 
higher family incomes but lower earnings than those in their late twenties. Presumably, a 
larger share of those in their early twenties are including their parents' incomes in the family 
incomes they report. 
30. Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn, and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry emphasize the importance for 
political activity of relative rather than absolute levels of education and point out that, as the 
public has become better educated, levels of political participation have not kept pace. See 
Table 8.1 Age and the Factors that Foster Political Activity 
Age Groups 
18-24 25-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71+ 
Education 
High School Diploma (Percent) 86% 91% 92% 90% 80% 74% 62% 
College Graduate (Percent) 9% 29% 29% 30% 26% 18% 18% 
Free Time (Mean Number of Hours per Day) 5.8 4.9 4.8 5.4 6.8 10.6 13.1 
Income (Thousands of Dollars) 
Mean Family Income $40.9 $36.4 $41.1 $50.4 $44.4 $33.0 $25.1 
Mean Earnings (All Respondents) $6.6 $17.8 $22.9 $27.2 $23.6 $7.1 $1.1 
Mean Earnings (Working Only) $9.8 $22.7 $27.0 $32.6 $33.1 $26.6 $40.4 
Mean Civic Skills• 
On the Job 0.85 1.54 1.79 1.98 1.48 0.49 0.04 
In a Nonpolitical Organization 0.36 0.50 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.79 0.57 
At Church 0.34 0.31 0.48 0.49 0.42 0.52 0.44 
Mean Number of Requests for Activity 
On the Job 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.10 0.04 
In a Nonpolitical Organization 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 
At Church 0.25 0.26 0.32 0.36 0.27 0.22 
Psychological Engagement with Politics 
Political Interestb 3.0 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.1 
Political Information' 
Civic Information (Percent) 56% 57% 60% 61% 54% 56% 
Knowledge of Names (Percent) 24% 32% 42% 50% 46% 53% 
Political Efficacy<~ 4.7 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.2 5.4 
Strong Partisanship (Percent) 22% 25% 29% 32% 38% 47% 
Source: Citizen Participation Study (1990). 
• Mean on an additive scale including the following: writing a letter, going to a meeting where the respondent took part in making 
decisions, planning or chairing a meeting, giving a presentation or speech, contacting a government official. 
0.01 
0.07 
o.i5 
3.7 
48% 
47% 
4.6 
43% 
b Mean on an additive scale measuring the amount of expressed interest-ranging from "not at all interested" to "very interested" -in 
national and local politics and affairs. 
'Percentage correct on each part of a political information scale consisting of five items testing knowledge of government and politics 
and three asking about the names of public officials 
d Mean on an additive scale of four items about how much attention a local or national government official would pay if the respondent 
had a complaint and how much influence the respondent has over local or national government decisions. 
214 Chapter 8 
Leaving school and getting a full-time job is clearly one of the stepping-
stones to adulthood, but it is not so much the fact of having a job as the asso-
ciation behveen paid work and several of the factors that foster political 
participation that matters for political participation. Jobs produce income, 
and those with jobs have opportunities to learn civic skills useful for political 
activity and become the targets of requests for political involvement. Obvi-
ously, such job-related participatory factors are available only to those who 
are employed, a group that includes relatively few of the elderly. And of course 
jobs vary not only in the extent to which they provide income, civic skills, 
and exposure to requests for activity but also in the extent to which opportu-
nities to acquire such participatory factors grow with accumulated workforce 
experience. 
Involvement in nonpolitical organizations and religious institutions func-
tions in a parallel manner to facilitate political participation. Presumably 
reflecting reduced levels of involvement and leadership in these venues, once 
again, the young and the elderly are less likely than those in between to gain 
civic skills or to be asked to take part politically in either of these venues. 31 
When it comes to several measures of psychological engagement with 
politics-measures not obviously attached to a particular life-cycle event but 
their Education and Democratic Citizenship in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996). 
31. These deficits in participatory factors among the elderly are consistent with a perspec-
tive, called disengagement theory, emphasizing that many of the very elderly have physical 
infirmities that impair their mobility and thus their ability to be active in civic life. In fact, 
research has discredited the idea that as people age they disengage from the world in favor of 
a more nuanced description of withdrawal to activities more appropriate to their age, with 
potential implications for politics. Norval D. Glenn and Michael Grimes, in "Aging, Voting, 
and Political Interest;' American Sociological Review 33 (1968): 563-573, consider but reject 
disengagement theory, as do M. Kent Jennings and Gregory Markus in "Political Involve-
ment in the Later Years: A Longitudinal Study;' American Journal of Political Science 32 
(1988): 302-316. The latter authors propose (p. 302) "selective withdrawal;' in which "partici-
pation in the more demanding modes declined following the transition to old age;' but point 
out that these "declines were partly offset by increased involvement of the elderly in age-
appropriate activities that can have direct political consequences:' 
We should also note a measurement issue. In the Citizen Participation Study, the items 
measuring the exercise of civic skills at work asked those currently in the workforce about 
such work-based activities as organizing a meeting within the past six months. Respondents 
who were retired were not asked these questions. Because having exercised civic skills at 
work might be expected to have a lasting effect into retirement, especially for those with long 
work histories in highly skilled jobs, the measure of civic skills, on average, underestimates 
the civic skills of the retired. 
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very powerful as predictors of political participation-those under age twenty-
five show low levels of involvement. The single exception is textbook knowl-
edge of the principles of American government-such matters as whether 
the Fifth Amendment shields freedom of speech or provides protection from 
forced confessions or whether the government spends more money on the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration or on Social Security. Other-
wise, younger respondents show a deficit when it comes to political interest, 
the knowledge of names of contemporary public officials, political efficacy, 
and strength of partisanship-all of which are strongly associated with par-
ticipation in politics.Jl 
Free time-that is, time unencumbered by responsibilities to paid work, 
school, or home and family-is the sole participatory resource for which the 
youngest, and especially the oldest, age groups are not disadvantaged in com-
parison to those in between. 
Disparities in Participation among Age Groups 
Consistent with these considerations and the findings of other researchers, 
political participation follows a curvilinear pattern across age groups.33 Let us 
consider first the disparities among age groups with respect to the political 
act on which scholarly attention has tended to focus exclusively, electoral 
turnout. Figure 8.4 presents U.S. Census data from 2008 and shows that vot-
ing turnout and voting registration were lowest among the young and 
increased for each age group before declining somewhat among the elderly.34 
32. Using the ANES cumulative file to sort out cohort and life-cycle effects for these kinds 
of factors, we can show that these results are not mostly due to cohort effects. These data 
show that young people are much less interested than older people and that interest peaks 
when people are in their fifties or sixties. Similarly, partisan strength is lowest for the young-
est age group, and it steadily increases throughout the age groups. The only exception is that 
data derived from the cumulative ANES about a different measure of political efficacy, this 
one measuring personal efficacy (that is, how much "say" the respondent has over what the 
government does), show a completely different pattern, with younger respondents more 
politically efficacious than their elders. 
33. Although this pattern emerges in data from other sources, age-group differences are 
more pronounced in the Citizen Participation Study. We are not certain whether this differ-
ence reflects a generational phenomenon, the particular attention paid to measuring acts of 
participation in that questionnaire, or something else. 
34. Numerous scholarly inquiries have found a genuine life-cycle effect with respect to 
voting turnout. See Norval D. Glenn and Michael Grimes, "Aging, Voting, and Political Inter-
est; American Sociological Review 33 (1968): 563-573; John M. Strate, Charles J. Parrish, 
Charles D. Elder, and Coit Ford, "Life Span Civic Development and Voting Participation; 
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Figure 8.4 Registered and Voting by Age, 2008 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2008). 
This age-related arc for turnout has been observed every election year since 
survey research on voting began.35 
Moving beyond the vote to a more expansive understanding of individual 
political voice, we see a similar trajectory in Figure 8.5, in which we use data 
from a 2008 survey conducted by the Pew Internet and American Life Proj-
ect and an additive scale of eight political acts.36 On average, those in their 
fifties, who are the most active group, engage in roughly 0.65 more acts than 
American Political Science Review 83 (1989): 443-464; Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, 
The New American Voter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Richard J. Tim-
pone, "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States," American Political Science 
Review 92 (1998): 145-158; and Eric Plutzer, "Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, 
and Growth in Young Adulthood," American Political Science Review 96 (2002): 41-56. 
35. In 1948, turnout was 41 percent for those in the youngest group (21-24), rising to 75 
percent for those between 45 and 54, then falling back to 59 percent for those between 65 and 
74. Similar results hold for each subsequent ANES conducted in a presidential election year. 
36. The scale includes the following acts: being registered to vote; working for a political 
party or candidate; contributing money to a political candidate or party; contacting a gov-
ernment official about an issue; working with fellow citizens to solve a problem in the com-
munity; attending a political meeting on local, town or school affairs; attending an organized 
protest of some kind; and being an active member of a group that tries to influence public 
policy or government. The point in the life cycle at which participation peaks before declin-
ing varies among political acts and across data sets. 
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Figure 8.5 Mean Political Acts by Age 
Source: Pew Internet and American Life Survey (2008). 
Note: The figure indicates the mean number of political acts from an 8-act scale 
that includes registering to vote; working for a political party or candidate; con-
tributing money to a political candidate or party; contacting a government offi-
cial about an issue; working with fellow citizens to solve a problem in the 
community; attending a political meeting on local, town, or school affairs; attend-
ing an organized protest of some kind; and being an active member of a group 
that tries to influence public policy or government. 
those under twenty-five and roughly 0.37 more acts than those who are sev-
enty and over. If we separate out the components in the scale measuring 
overall participation, it becomes clear that individual forms of political activ-
ity do not all conform to this pattern. As shown in Table 8.2, the two least 
common activities-working for a political party or candidate and attending a 
protest-are the province of the young. Although these two activities are rare 
in any age group, those in the youngest age group are the most likely to engage 
in them, and the share declines with age. The participation rates for the re-
maining six activities all take on a more or less curvilinear shape. There is a 
particularly steep start-up for younger people when it comes to registering to 
vote and contacting government officials and a particularly steep "wind-down" 
for the elderly when it comes to involvement in community affairs. 
Table 8.2 Age and Political Participation 
Percentage of Each Age Group Who Engaged in Each Activity 
18-24 25-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71+ 
Registered to Vote 55% 73% 77% 84% 86% 83% 89% 
Worked for a Political Party or Candidate 11% 9% 8% 8% 8% 8% 6% 
Made a Political Contribution 7% 13% 18% 20% 23% 22% 21% 
Contacted a Government Official 16% 27% 28% 29% 39% 36% 28% 
Worked with Others to Solve a Community Problem 25% 30% 30% 33% 27% 27% 21% 
Attended a Local Meeting 23% 22% 29% 30% 23% 19% 15% 
Attended a Protest 9% 5% 4% 3% 2% 2% 2% 
Affiliated with a Group that Takes Stands in Politics 14% 18% 18% 16% 17% 14% 6% 
Source: Pew Internet and American Life Project Survey (August 2008). 
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Accounting for Age Differences in Political Participation 
From the perspective of inequalities of political voice, we have observed two 
critical patterns: there are significant differences in political activity across 
age groups, and age groups differ in their political attitudes and concerns-in 
ways that reflect both generation and life cycle. In Chapter 5 we discussed 
differences in political voice among politically relevant groups-in particular 
between women and men and among African Americans, non-Hispanic 
whites, and Latinos. There we made the point that, even if those group dis-
parities could be explained in terms of other factors that are associated with 
political activity, especially social class, what matters for inequalities of polit-
ical voice is the fact of the disparities rather than the other attributes that 
account for them. The same argument can be made here. Still, it seems worth 
placing participatory differences among age groups in the context of our 
understanding of the factors that foster political activity. 
The differences among age groups with respect to two components of 
social class, income and education, have obvious consequences for participa-
tion. Figure 8.6 shows for SES quintiles the average score on the eight-point 
scale measuring overall participation for each of seven age groups and con-
firms an ongoing theme of our inquiry, the strength of the association between 
social class and participation. The lines for the age groups cluster together 
and, as expected, for each one, average participation rises sharply with SESY 
Considering an Array of Participatory Factors 
Our account of participation in politics rests on understanding a variety of 
attributes in addition to SES that foster political activity. Some of them-for 
example, exposure to a politically rich home environment, experiences in 
student government and other organized activities while in high school, and 
high levels of educational attainment-are more or less fixed in childhood 
and adolescence and brought into adulthood.38 Others-for example, income, 
civic skills, and interest in and knowledge about politics-can vary with adult 
experiences in such domains as the family, workplace, and church. 
37. The only obvious exception is the sharp drop in the highest SES quintile for those 
between eighteen and twenty-four years of age, which is probably sampling error due to the 
very small sample size of only ten respondents. 
38. On the significance for adult political engagement of the nonpolitical voluntary 
involvement of youth, see Daniel A. McFarland and Reuben J. Thomas, "Bowling Young: 
How Youth Voluntary Associations Influence Adult Political Participation:· American Socio-
logical Review 71 (2006): 401-425. 
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Figure 8.6 Mean Political Acts by Age and SES Quintile 
Source: Pew Internet and American Life Survey (2008). 
Note: For definitions of political acts see note to Figure 8.5. 
5 
Highest 
A number of these variables have a generational as well as a life-cycle com-
ponent. We have mentioned that, at least until recently, successive genera-
tions have become, on average, better and better educated. Furthermore, 
Robert Putnam has shown substantial generational differences between the 
long civic generation, born roughly between 1910 and 1940, and Generation 
X, born between 1964 and 1980, with respect to a variety of attitudinal and 
behavioral measures of civic commitment and engagement.39 
To gain a sense of whether differences in these factors explain the partici-
pation gaps among age groups, we employ two complementary methods. 
First we turn to the data from the 1990 Citizen Participation Study. Because 
these data are cross-sectional, they have serious liabilities for our attempt to 
39. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), chap. 14. See also Stephen Bennett, Staci Rhine, and 
Richard Flickinger, "Young Americans' Attention to Media Accounts of Politics;' paper deliv-
ered at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April2007. 
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understand the differences among age groups in political activity, in particu-
lar, the extent to which such differences reflect generational or life-cycle 
effects. Still, because they contain such a rich array of relevant measures, they 
are helpful in illuminating both the relative importance of various factors in 
explaining political activity and the extent to which age-group differences 
with respect to these factors explain the disparities in participation. Second 
we use the ANES cumulative data to separate out life-cycle and cohort effects. 
Although the ANES lacks many relevant measures, its repeated cross-sections 
make it possible to control for cohort effects and to identify the remaining 
effects as due to life-cycle factors. 40 
Table 8.3 presents the results of an ordinary least squares analysis of data 
from the Citizen Participation Study in which the dependent variable is an 
eight-point measure of overall political activity. Even with many variables 
taken into account, several aspects of the legacy of the years before adult-
hood are significantly associated with political participation: exposure to a 
politically rich home environment, participation in student government 
and other activities in high school, and especially educational attainment. 
In addition, a number of factors related to development during adult-
hood are associated with political activity: family income, civic skills and 
requests for activity associated with the workplace, involvement in non-
political organizations and religious institutions, and various measures 
of political engagement-in particular, interest in politics. It is noteworthy 
that, with these factors controlled, the amount of free time available has 
absolutely no impact on political participation, a finding that has emerged 
from these data over and over again.41 
The evidence for the impact of particular life events is much more mixed. 
In spite of the frequently heard comment "It wasn't until I had kids in school 
that I got involved in the issues in this town;· we find much more limited con-
firmation of the hypothesis that lower levels of activity among the young are a 
function of their not yet having assumed the respo~sibilities of adulthood-
job, marriage, children, and home ownership. On one hand, home ownership 
and the number of years in the community retain positive effects on activity 
even with everything else taken into account-suggesting that the stake in the 
40. As indicated earlier, we are not treating period effects. , 
41. Although the amount of available leisure does not predict political participation, 
among those who take part in politics, spare time does predict how much time is devoted to 
voluntary political activity. See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, pp. 340-
341 and 357, and Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, Private Roots of Public Action, pp. 256-257. 
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Table 8.3 Predicting Overall Political Activity: 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
Variable B SEB Beta 
Age 
18-24 -.64*** .13 -.12 
25-30 -.44*** .10 -.10 
31-40 -.02 .08 -.01 
41-50 Baseline Group 
51-60 .13 .10 .02 
61-70 -.12 .12 -.02 
71+ -.32* .16 -.05 
Other Demographic Characteristics 
Female -.02 .06 -.01 
Black .07 .09 .01 
Latino -.04 .13 -.01 
The Legacy of Youth 
Politics at Home .04* .02 .04 
High School Activity .10*** .03 .06 
Education .16*** .02 .15 
Resources 
Family Income .04*** .01 .07 
Earnings .01 .01 .02 
Free Time -.01 .01 -.02 
Civic Skills .10*** .02 .14 
Nonpolitical Involvements 
Affiliation with an Organization .02 .06 .00 
Church Attendance -.02 .01 -.03 
Requests for Activity .23*** .03 .13 
Political Engagement 
Political Interest .23*** .02 .22 
Political Information .09*** .02 .10 
Political Efficacy .08*** .01 .11 
Partisanship .08** .03 .04 
Community Roots 
Years in Community .00* .00 .05 
Own Home .21*** .06 .06 
continued 
Political Participation over the Life Cycle 223 
Table 8.3 Continued 
Variable B SEB Beta 
Marital Status 
Married -.09 .09 -.03 
Separated or Divorced -.25* .10 -.05 
Widowed -.34* .14 -.06 
Single (Never Married) Baseline Group 
Children 
Preschool Age -.12 .08 -.03 
School Age -.13 .08 -.03 
Employment Status 
Student -.48* .20 -.05 
Full-Time Work -.66*** .16 -.20 
Part-Time Work -.57*** .16 -.10 
Retired Baseline Group 
Unemployed or Other -.59*** .16 -.09 
Keeping House -.37** .13 -.08 
Job Level -.01 .02 -.01 
Constant -1.08*** .25 
Source: Citizen Participation Study (1990). 
Note: The dependent variable is an 8-act measure of political activity that includes 
the following: voting; working in a campaign; contributing to a campaign; con-
tacting a public official; taking part in a protest, march, or demonstration; working 
with others in the community to solve a local problem; serving on a local commu-
nity board or regularly attending meetings of such a board; and being affiiiated 
with an organization that takes stands in politics. 
*Significant at the .OS level; **significant at the .01level; ***significant at the .001 
level. 
community that accompanies owning a home and long residence does make 
a difference. 
On the other hand, whatever association there is between the role of worker, 
spouse, or parent and increased participation results either from selection 
effects such that those who take on adult roles have other characteristics that 
predispose them to take part or from indirect effects such that these roles 
lead to greater involvement in civil society or, in particular, increased politi-
cal engagement. Compared to being retired, being in the workforce, espe-
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cially full time, which had been presumed to increase an individual's stake in 
political outcomes and thus to serve as a spur to activity, has a negative impact, 
as do being a student, being unemployed, or being at home-even with age 
and leisure time taken into account.42 However, there is a significant associa-
tion between political participation and what happens at work in terms of the 
development of civic skills and exposure to requests for political activity-
which are, of course, dependent on having a job. 
With respect to marriage and family, although being widowed, divorced, or 
separated are all negatively associated with political activity compared to 
being single, marriage and the presence of either preschool or school-aged 
children at home are not significantly related to political participation. Fur-
ther analysis shows very modest indirect effects from having children at 
home, effects that are opposite in direction for men and women.43 Because, on 
average, women reduce their workforce commitment when they have chil-
dren at home, the resultant impact on workplace-based skills and recruitment 
implies a perceptible but tiny diminution of their political activity. For men, 
both marriage and children at home enhance their commitment to paid work 
and their involvement in religious institutions, thus leading indirectly to an 
increase in political participation that, while still very slight, is more than twice 
as large as the negative impact of children on women's activity. 
Interestingly, accounting for these many factors leaves no statistically sig-
nificant difference in participation between men and women or among non-
Hispanic whites, African Americans, and Latinos. However, it does not go 
the distance in terms of explaining the participatory gap between the most 
active age group, those in their forties, and either the young or the elderly: 
Initial Deficit Deficit Remaining 
Compared to Those after Accounting for 
in Their Forties Participatory Factors 
Under25 1.25 acts 0.64 act 
25-30 0.88 act 0.44 act 
71 and over 0.64 act 0.32 act 
42. As indicated in note 31, the Citizen Participation Study did not ask retired respon-
dents about the exercise of civic skills in their previous jobs. We speculate that the positive 
association between retirement and political activity results from the residual effects of a life-
time of work in terms of civic skills. 
43. This analysis is reported in Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, Private Roots of Public Action, 
pp. 316-321. 
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Once the various participatory factors have been taken into account, the par-
ticipatory deficits at the near and far ends of the life cycle, while still statisti-
cally significant, have been reduced by about half and the familiar curvilinear 
pattern is harder to discern. 
That a variety of participatory factors together account for differences in 
activity between groups based on gender and on race or ethnicity-but not 
for disparities in political activity among age groups-is intriguing. One expla-
nation for the participatory gaps that remain is that there are likely to be 
unmeasured attributes that not only vary systematically with age but have 
consequences for participation. For example, chronic illness, a variable that 
was not measured, has been shown to depress participation; we would expect 
the elderly to be especially likely to face chronic illness. Without appropriate 
measures, we are able to do nothing more than speculate.44 Furthermore, 
there are generational processes at work with differential effects on the vari-
ous age groups in the 1990 Citizen Participation Study. That is, if, as is often 
argued, the members of Generation X, who were under thirty at the time of 
the survey, entered the electorate at particularly low rates of political activity, 
the participatory factors that account for differences in activity among other 
groups would be insufficient to account fully for the participatory deficit 
among the young. We investigate this possibility in the next section. 
In Chapter 6 we saw that processes of habituation such that, once having 
taken part, individuals become more likely to do so again, apart from the 
other characteristics that predispose them to participate, operate only for 
voting and not for other participatory acts. Because voting is one of the polit-
ical acts on the scale and because the young have low rates of turnout, habit-
uation may have a tiny role in explaining the deficit of activity among those 
under thirty, a role that would be nearly impossible to measure. 
How Important Are Life-Cycle-Effects 
for Political Participation? 
The other interpretation of the unexplained participatory gaps among age 
groups is that they represent generational rather than life-cycle phenomena. 
There is a great deal of evidence that, compared to their predecessors, cohorts 
that have entered the electorate recently are less likely to vote or to engage in 
44. Steven A. Peterson, in "Biosocial Predictors of Older Americans' Political Participa-
tion;' Politics and the Life Sciences 5 (1987): 246-251, finds evidence for a relationship between 
health status and political orientations and behaviors. 
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other forms of activity.45 We are led to ask whether there are any life-cycle 
effects at all. Unfortunately, the sophisticated econometric methods used in 
Chapter 6 to seek evidence of processes of habituation have three defects. 
They require at least three-wave panels in which the same people are inter-
viewed three times in succession. They need very large samples of data to 
detect effects because they have low statistical power. And, perhaps most im-
portant, with measurement periods just four years long, they fall short of the 
time period required to capture most life-cycle effects. We now turn to a 
method that, while it has limitations, has the virtue of being simple and 
straightforward. We use the repeated data cross-sections for all presidential 
elections from 1952 to 2008 from the ANES to search for life-cycle effects 
while controlling for cohort effects. To control for cohort effects, we ran regres-
sions that had dummy variables both for age groups and for cohorts.46 
Figure 8.7 plots for each of five political acts the net life-cycle (or age-
group) effects estimated from separate regressions, which include controls 
for cohort effects, for each act. Because we chose those between forty-one 
and fifty as the baseline group for the regressions, all the curves for that age 
group go through zero for ages forty-one to fifty. The values on each curve 
that can be read off the vertical axis are percentage increases or decreases in 
the activity from that baseline for each of the other age groups. Because the 
ANES traditionally focuses on participatory acts related to elections, four of 
them are electoral. Except for voting, all of them are relatively rare: voting 
(74 percent); writing a letter to a government official (24 percent); giving 
money to a candidate or party (10 percent); working for a candidate ( 4 per-
45. See, for example, William Lyons and Robert Alexander, "A Tale of Two Electorates: 
Generational Replacement and the Decline of Voting in Presidential Elections," Journal of 
Politics 62 {2000): 1014-1034; Marc Hooghe, "Political Socialization and the Future of Poli-
tics," Acta Politica 39 {2004): 331-341; Cliff Zukin, Scott Keeter, Molly Andolina, Krista Jen-
kins, and Michael X. Delli Carpini, A New Engagement? Political Participation, Civic Life, and 
the Changing American Citizen (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2006); Martin P. 
Wattenberg, Is Voting for Young People? With a Postscript on Citizen Engagement (New York: 
Pearson Longman, 2008); Kaat Smets, "In Need of an Update or Overdue? Re-evaluating the 
Political Life-Cycle Model," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political 
Science Association, Chicago, Apri13-6, 2008); Constance Flanagan and Peter Levine, "Civic 
Engagement and the Transition to Adulthood," Future of Children 20 (2010): 159-179. Various 
authors point to compensatory factors. Hooghe shows that younger cohorts, although less 
politically involved, display greater tolerance, and Zukin et al. show that they demonstrate a 
greater commitment to nonpolitical voluntary activity. 
46. See Appendix D for an explication of our methods and their limitations as well as dis-
cussion of the reasons that we feel justified in ignoring period effects. 
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Figure 8.7 Life-Cycle Effects for Five Political Acts: Percentage Departure 
in Activity for Each Act from That of Baseline Age Group (41-50) in Cohort-
Corrected Regressions 
Source: American National Election Studies (1952-2008). 
cent); and attending political meetings, rallies, and the like in support of a 
candidate (7 percent). For all five of the activities, there are clear processes of 
start-up for younger people. That is, apart from cohort effects, the youngest 
citizens are less likely than their middle-aged counterparts to undertake any 
of the five acts. Not unexpectedly for a set of acts of quite varying frequency, 
the magnitude of the deficit differs across the acts and is especially pro-
nounced for writing to public officials, voting, and, to a lesser extent, making 
contributions. On the basis of what we saw earlier in the chapter, had we had 
access to data about taking part in protests, we would have expected a very 
different pattern and no shortfall among new voters. We also see processes of 
wind-down for older people that are particularly marked for the three activi-
ties that, under most circumstances, require leaving home to accomplish: 
voting, working in a campaign, and going to a political meeting. Thus, with 
the controls for cohort, these data strongly suggest that there are real life-
cycle effects at work. 
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We took this analysis one step further to see if we could explain away life-
cycle effects by cohort differences or by changing participatory factors over a 
lifetime. We constructed a five-act scale of political activity that includes four 
of the five acts just discussed (all but writing a letter) and that adds another 
act (talking to people about why they should vote)Y Using this scale as the 
dependent variable, we conducted three separate regressions to identify raw 
life-cycle effects, life-cycle effects adjusted for cohort differences, and life-
cycle effects after adjusting for cohort differences and participatory factors. 
The solid line in Figure 8.8 shows the highly curvilinear raw life-cycle 
effects for this five-act scale. Because we are interested only in how the shape 
of this curve changes as we control for various factors, we set the participa-
tion of those in the forty-one to fifty age group at zero even though, in fact, 
their participation averages 1.4 acts throughout the period. Although those 
who are a decade older (between fifty-one and sixty years of age) are slightly 
more active than this baseline group, all other age groups are less active-as 
much as four-tenths of an act less active for the youngest and oldest age groups, 
which means that these two groups actually average about one act. The 
dashed line shows that, once we control for cohort differences, the life-cycle 
effects for older people are somewhat less pronounced. Adding to the regres-
sion participatory factors such as education, income, and various measures 
of psychological engagement with politics explains even more of the raw life-
cycle effects and yields the dotted line at the top of the diagram. Although the 
arc has about half the depth that we saw for the raw life-cycle curve, the line 
still retains a curvilinear shape. 
Our analyses surely show variation in political activity over the life cycle. 
Two regressions using somewhat different measures of political participation 
as dependent variables-one using data from the Citizen Participation Study, 
which includes an array of participatory factors, and the other adjusting for 
cohort effects while using the narrower array of participatory factors available 
in the ANES-conclude that there are life-cycle effects even after controlling 
for a large number of factors. In addition, the controls in both regressions-
such as education, income, partisan strength, and political interest-themselves 
exhibit life-cycle effects. There can be no question about the reality of true life-
cycle differences in political participation. 
47. We did not use "writing a letter" because it was not asked in all the years. The item 
asking whether the respondent talked to any people and tried to show them why they should 
vote was asked throughout the period. 
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Figure 8.8 Life-Cycle Effects of Political Activity: Raw Effects, Cohort-
Adjusted Effects, and Cohort- and Participatory Factors-Adjusted Effects 
Source: American National Election Studies (1952-2008). 
Note: The dependent variable is a 5-act scale that includes voting; talking to 
people about why they should vote; giving money to a candidate or party; work-
ing for a candidate; and attending political meetings. 
• This line indicates how much each age group's average participation on the 5-act 
scale departs from that of the reference group (41-50). 
b This line indicates how much each age group's average participation on the 5-act 
scale departs from that of the reference group (41-50) after a regression adjust-
ment for cohort differences. 
c This line indicates how much each age group's average participation on the 5-act 
scale departs from that of the reference group (41-50) after a regression adjust-
ment for participatory factors and cohort differences. 
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Conclusion 
In spite of attention by pundits to the lack of involvement of the younger gen-
eration, political scientists have long discerned a curvilinear pattern across 
the life cycle such that participation is relatively low among those entering 
the electorate, picks up among those in their thirties, peaks among the mid-
dle aged, and tails off among the elderly. We have found that same pattern in 
several data sets. 
From one perspective, the attendant disparities in political voice differ 
from those rooted in such politically relevant categories as race or gender. To 
the extent that they are anchored in life-cycle effects, the young need only be 
patient; with time their levels of political participation will increase in mid-
dle age. At the other end of the life cycle, the elderly have had their chance. 
However, these disparities among age groups in political activity are accom-
panied by age-related differences in political preferences and concerns. There-
fore, even though political voice can be equalized across the life cycle for 
those who live a normal life span, the age-related gaps in political participa-
tion have consequences for inequality of political voice. Furthermore, if there 
are cohort effects that accompany a particular generation across the life cycle, 
that group will enjoy a participatory advantage or suffer a participatory dis-
advantage on a sustained basis. Once again, equality of political voice would 
be compromised. 
Although we do not have a long-term panel containing rich measures of 
both participatory factors and political acts, which would allow us to solve 
the puzzles posed by differences among age groups in political activity, we 
mobilized a number of data sets and some complicated methods in pursuit of 
that objective. A cross-sectional regression that included a variety of factors 
known to be associated with participation showed that, with the exception of 
owning a home and staying put residentially, the milestones of adulthood do 
not really function as expected in enhancing participation directly. Any dis-
cernible participatory consequences of getting a job, getting married, or hav-
ing children result either from selection effects or from the way that the 
resulting adult statuses lead to the acquisition of participatory factors in such 
venues as the workplace or religious institutions and thus indirectly to 
increased political activity. In fact, the more powerful predictors of political 
activity among adults are such factors-many of them rooted in social class-
as resources, psychological orientations to politics, and location in networks 
that mediate requests to take part. 
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That said, these participatory factors were not able to explain fully the dis-
parities among age groups in overall participation. Ordinarily, a model focus-
ing on the role of resources, motivation, and recruitment is able to account 
for participatory differences among demographic groups. Leaving aside the 
critical question of why groups distinguished by gender or race differ in 
class-based participatory factors, we are able to specify what it is about being 
African American or being female that leads to lower rates of political partic-
ipation.48 The disparity in participation between African Americans and Anglo 
whites disappears when racial differences in education and income are taken 
into account. The gap in activity between women and men can be fully ex-
plained by gender differences in education, income, civic skills, and political 
engagement. Life-cycle differences seem to persist even after controlling for a 
large number of factors. In fact, the unexplained portion of the disparity 
between the most and least active age groups is actually twice as large as the 
initial gap in activity between African Americans and Anglo whites or between 
women and men-before anything else is taken into account. 
Using data from ANES panel studies and from more than a half century of 
ANES cross-sections, we were able to investigate further the origins of gaps 
among age groups in participation and found evidence for both cohort and 
life-cycle effects. Still, as important as it is to distinguish these effects in order 
to understand the roots of disparities in participation among age groups, 
from the perspective of equality of political voice, what matters is the fact of 
those disparities. 
48. See, for example, Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, "Race, 
Ethnicity, and Political Participation," in Classifying by Race, ed. Paul E. Peterson (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 15, and Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, Private 
Roots of Public Action, chap. 10. 
